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LABOR LAw-STATE JurusmcTION OVER AcTs WmcH ARE UN-
FAIR LABOR PRACTICES UNDER FEDERAL LABOR LEGISLATION-Exten-
sive federal labor legislation under the commerce clause has created a 
perplexing jurisdictional problem in the state courts, which are con-
fronted increasingly with the critical issue of possible conB.ict with a 
federal preemptive area of operation. The extent to which the federal 
government has superseded state jurisdiction over labor matters has 
remained unsettled under the current case law and the legislative 
history of the federal acts, and the need for clarification is apparent 
at a time when labor cases are reaching the courts in increasing num-
bers. It is natural for unions to raise the issue of lack of jurisdiction in 
state courts to avoid sanctions dictated by local policies, and to resort to 
the National Labor Relations Board for uniform and comprehensive 
remedial action. Employers, on the other hand, depending on celerity 
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of action to prevent economic losses, tend to resort to state tribunals, 
which usually offer a swifter remedy than does federal administrative 
action. Two recent decisions by the Supreme Court are significant to 
the clarification of this area of federal-state relations. It is the purpose 
of this comment to consider the import of these decisions. 
The State of the Law 
In Garner 11. Teamsters Union,1 petitioner was engaged in a truck-
ing business. It alleged that respondent union picketed its business 
for the purpose of forcing petitioner to coerce its employees into joining 
respondent union. No labor dispute existed at the time between peti-
tioner and its employees. The state trial court found the picketing to 
be a violation of the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act:2 and issued an 
injunction. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed,3 and the 
United States Supreme Court affirmed the Pennsylvania· Supreme 
Court, holding that petitioner had alleged facts possibly constituting an 
unfair labor practice under section 8(b)(2) of the National Labor 
Relations Act4 which the National Labor Relations Board is empowered 
to prevent, and that state procedures directed to the same end are pre-
cluded. · 
In United Construction Workers 11. Laburnum Construction Corp.5 
plaintiff-building contractor was engaged in construction work for sev-
eral mining companies, and held contracts with them for future work. 
Its skilled employees were members of an A.F.L. local, while its un-
skilled employees were unorganized. Defendant union demanded that 
plaintiff recognize it as the sole bargaining agent for all employees on 
the job, and attempted, with a show of violence, to persuade the em-
ployees to join it. As a result, the project was abandoned when plain-
tiff's employees feared to work, and plaintiff's contracts for future work 
were cancelled by the mining companies because of defendant union's 
threat to call out members of the United Mine Workers employed iri 
the coal mines. In a tort action6 it was held that a state court has juris-
diction to entertain an action for damages even though the alleged 
1 346 U.S. 485, 74 S.Ct. 161 (1953). 
2 Pa. Laws (1937) 1168, Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1952) tit. 43, §211.6. 
3 373 Pa. 19, 94 A. (2d) 893 (1953). 
4 61 Stat. L. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §158. 
5 347 U.S. 656, 74 S.Ct. 833 (1954). 
6 The nature of the tort was not discussed by the Supreme Court. However, from the 
state court's opinion, it seems the tort was that of unjustified interference with petitioner's 
business or contractual relations. 
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tortious conduct may also be an unfair labor practice under section 
8(b)(l) of the NLRA. Two justices dissented. 
The preemption doctrine is based upon the supremacy clause of 
the Constitution. Fundamentally, the proposition is that when Con-
gress legislates in a field subject to its control, its power is superior to 
and may supersede state power in the same area. However, Congress 
is not required to displace entirely state jurisdiction. It can preempt 
only a part of it, leaving to the states concurrent jurisdiction over the 
remainder.7 As a general rule, preemption of state police power by 
implication is not favored and will not be inferred unless the assertion 
of state authority would so conflict with the asserted federal power that 
it becomes necessary to exclude state power in order to make the federal 
policies effective. 8 
Congress in section 10 of the NLRA has empowered the NLRB 
"to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice 
(listed. in sec. 8) affecting commerce," but, with certain exceptions, 
has not explicitly defined the scope of its exclusive control or the extent 
of the jurisdiction retained by the states. To determine the scope of 
implied preemption of state power, each provision of the federal law 
is usually examined and an attempt is made to determine the effect of 
the varying degrees of state authority on the execution of the federal 
policy. The results of this procedure are often inconclusive, and the 
"rules" can only be stated contingently, each resting upon assumptions 
as to interpretation of statutory language and the policy behind the 
law.9 This inconclusiveness stems from the fact that Congress, in 
enacting this legislation, probably had no conscious or deliberate inten-
tion of formulating a rule to solve the federal-state relations problem. 
Obviously this jurisdictional problem is of extreme importance. If Con-
gress had definite intentions as to the power to be left to the states, it 
7 Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. I, 58 S.Ct. 87 (1937); Amalgamated Association 
v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 340 U.S. 383, 71 S.Ct. 359 (1951). 
s Texas and Pacific Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 27 S.Ct. 350 
(1907); California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 at 733, 69 S.Ct. 841 (1949). 
9 See, e.g., the somewhat varying conclusions of the following writers: Smith, ''The 
Taft-Hartley Act and State Jurisdiction over Labor Relations,'' 46 MICH. L. fulv. 593 
(1948); Rose, "The Labor Management Relations Act and the State's Power to Grant 
Relief," 39 VA. L. fu;v. 765 (1953); Cox, "Federalism in the Law of Labor-Relations,'' 67 
ILmv. L. fulv. 1297 (1954); Handler, "The Impact of the Labor-Management Relations 
Act of 1947 upon the Jurisdiction of State Courts over Union Activities,'' 26 TEMPLE L.Q. 
Ill (1952); Hays, "Federalism and Labor Relations in the United States," 102 UNIV. 
PA. L. fulv. 959 (1954); Cox and Siedman, ''Federalism and Labor Relations,'' 64 !Lmv. 
L. fulv. 211 (1950); Hombein, "The Extent to which the Taft-Hartley Law Supersedes 
State Labor Laws," 28 ThcrA 47 (1951); 27 N.Y. UNIV. L. fulv. 468 (1952); 47 MICH. 
L. fulv. 1201 (1949). 
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is reasonable to assume that these intentions would have been spelled 
out rather than left to inference. Thus, justification of a particular 
decision by reference to a fictitious "intent of Congress" simply is an 
attempt to rationalize a conclusion which the court thinks is wise, con-
sidering the general policy and purposes of federal labor legislation. 
Prior to the Garner case the Court had several times faced the ques-
tion of state injunctive power in other contexts. It held that states may 
enjoin violence even though it is union concerted activity,10 and that 
they may prohibit unlawful types of nonviolent activity not protected 
by federal legislation.11 Possibly states may also enjoin activity within 
the jurisdiction of the Board when the Board will not exercise that 
jurisdiction on policy grounds under its self-declared jurisdictional 
standards.12 These rulings may be explained on the basis that the union 
conduct in question was not an unfair labor practice as defined in sec-
tion 8 of the NLRA and that therefore there had been no federal 
assertion of control, thus leaving the activity subject to state regula-
tion.13 When, however, the activity is an "unfair labor practice," these 
cases are not necessarily controlling. Several state courts held that 
they did not have power to enjoin conduct which was an unfair labor 
10 Allen-Bradley Local No. Ill v. WEBB, 315 U.S. 740, 62 S.Ct. 820 (1942); Hotel 
and Restaurant Employees' International Alliance v. WEBB, 315 U.S. 437, 62 S.Ct. 706 
(1942). 
llJnternational Union v. WEBB, 336 U.S. 245, 69 S.Ct. 516 (1949) (recurrent 
unannounced walkouts). There are numerous state courts so holding: Goodwins, Inc. v. 
Hagedorn, 303 N.Y. 300, 101 N.E. (2d) 697 (1951); General Building Contractors' 
Assn. v. Local Union 542, 370 Pa. 73, 87 A. (2d) 250 (1952); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. 
Weber, (Mo. 1954) 265 S.W. (2d) 325; International Assn. of Machinists v. GofF-McNair 
Co., (Ark. 1954) 264 S.W. (2d) 48; S-M News Co. v. Simons, 279 App. Div. 364, 110 
N.Y.S. (2d) 174 (1952). 
12 NLRB Press Release R-449 as reported in 34 L.R.R.M. 261 (1954). In Building 
Trades Council v. Kinard Construction Co., 346 U.S. 933, 74 S.Ct. 373, 33 L.R.R.M. 
2394 (1954), the Supreme Court per curiam expressly refused to pass on the question of 
the jurisdiction of a state court in a case where the NLRB refused to exercise its jurisdic-
tion. In the Gamer case the Court had said, after finding that that case was not of the 
type which was within state jurisdiction, "Nor is there any suggestion • • • that the federal 
Board would decline to exercise its powers once its jurisdiction was invoked." Possibly this 
is a hint that if the Board were to refuse to exercise its jurisdiction, a state could supply 
injunctive relief. A Michigan circuit court, citing the Kinard case, held that it could issue 
an injunction in this situation on the ground that the NLRB, by establishing jurisdictional 
standards, ceded jurisdiction to those states having no inconsistent statutes, as provided in 
§lO(a) NLRA as amended. Satin, Inc. v. Electrical Workers, (Cir. Ct. Calhoun County, 
Michigan 1954) 34 L.R.R.M. 2258. See also cases in 32 A.L.R. (2d) 1034-1036 (1953) 
holding that states can enjoin unfair labor practices pending Board action directed toward 
getting a temporary restraining order under §§l0G) or (I), on the theory that the state's 
jurisdiction is ancillary in that it preserves the status quo until the Board acts. 
13 See Anheuser Busch, Inc. v. Weber, (Mo. 1954) 265 S.W. (2d) 325; International 
Assn. of Machinists v. GofF-McNair Co., (Ark. 1954) 264 S.W. (2d) 48. 
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practice;14 a court of appeals held that a federal court did not have such 
jurisdiction;15 and a state court held that a state administrative board 
could not prevent the unfair labor practice under state law.16 The 
Supreme Court had not expressly so ruled, however, prior to the Garner 
case, although in the Plankinton case1 7 this was clearly the ratio 
decidendi. The latter case involved conduct constituting an unfair 
labor practice, and the Court's per curiam opinion summarily denied 
a state administrative board jurisdiction to prevent such conduct under 
state law. The Garner case, as interpreted in Laburnum, settles the 
matter by holding that when Congress provided its "preventive proce-
dure," it displaced all state procedures directed to the same end. 
The Court had never, before Laburnum, faced the question of state 
jurisdiction when one party seeks a damage remedy rather than an in-
junction. A federal court had held that it had jurisdiction under section 
30 I of the LMRA to give damages for breach of a collective bargaining 
agreement even though the violation involved a possible unfair labor 
practice.18 Several state courts had upheld their jurisdiction to give 
damages when the activity complained of was both a tort and an unfair 
labor practice.1° The Laburnum case confirms this result but cites none 
of these cases. 
The Rule and Its Significance 
The result of these cases seems anomalous. As a logical proposition, 
it is difficult to see how a state has jurisdiction to award compensation 
for the results of activity which it has no jurisdiction to prevent.20 The 
14 Costaro v. Simons, 302 N.Y. 318, 98 N.E. (2d) 454 (1951); annotation, 32 
A.L.R. (2d) 1027 at 1032 (1953). Contra, Montgomery Building and Trades Council v. 
Ledbetter Erection Co., 256 Ala. 678, 57 S. (2d) 112 (1951), cert. dismissed on jurisdic-
tional grounds 344 U.S. 178, 73 S.Ct. 196 (1952), which held that a state court could 
enjoin a secondary boycott. 
15Amazon Cotton Mill Co. v. Textile Workers Union of America, (4th Cir. 1948) 
167 F. (2d) 183. See also United Packinghouse Workers of America v. Wilson and Co., 
(D.C. ill. 1948) 80 F. Supp. 563. 
16 Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board v. Frank, 362 Pa. 537, 67 A. (2d) 78 (1949). 
17 Plankinton Packing Co. v. WERE, 338 U.S. 953, 70 S.Ct. 491 (1950). 
18Textile Workers Union of America v. Arista Mills, (4th Cir. 1951) 193 F. (2d) 
529. See also Reed v. Fawick Air:Hex Co., (D.C. Ohio 1949) 86 F. Supp. 822. 
19 Barile v. Fisher, 197 Misc. 493, 94 N.Y.S. (2d) 346 (1949); Russel v. International 
Union, 258 Ala. 615, 64 S. (2d) 384 (1953); Kuzuma v. Millinery Workers Union, Local 
No. 24, 27 N.J. Super. 579, 99 A. (2d) 833 (1953). 
20 In certain cases courts will award damages for activity they will not enjoin, as in 
the case of libel, or will give damages for failing to do what the court would not force the 
defendant to do, as in the case of specific performance of certain contracts. In these cases 
the court has jurisdiction to require or to restrain the performance, but refuses to exercise 
that jurisdiction. In the unfair labor practice situation, the Gamer case held that the state 
court did not have the jurisdiction to act in the first instance, even if it so desired. 
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Court's explanation is that the conB.ict lies in the remedies21 if both the 
states and the NLRB were held to have power to prevent the activity 
complained of, whereas there is no such remedial conB.ict in the damage 
case since the NLRB has no general power to award damages upon 
finding an unfair labor practice.22 Taking these cases together, the rule 
for determining the jurisdiction of a state over activity constituting an 
unfair labor practice appears to be that a state has its traditional juris-
diction over any case, provided the type of remedy sought is not avail-
able under the federal act.23 The Court rejects the argument that in 
de.fining unfair practices and providing but one remedy for them Con-
gress "intended" this to be the exclusive remedy.24 As noted above, 
the process of inferring intent where there likely was none is unsatis-
factory at best. The validity of the rule ultimately will rest on consid-
erations of policy and utility. 
The constitutional justification for the federal labor legislation is 
that such legislation is needed to prevent obstructions of interstate 
commerce.25 The effects of an unfair labor practice are not necessarily 
confined to state boundaries, and states are therefore believed to be 
unable to cope adequately with the problems presented. To facilitate 
the free B.ow of commerce, Congress entered the field and provided sub-
stantive rules and a central agency to apply procedures designed to 
21 Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 at 498, 74 S.Ct. 161 (1953). 
22 Under §IO(a) "the Board is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent any 
person from engaging in any unfair labor practice. • • ." Emphasis added. In preventing 
the proscribed practices, the Board under §IO(c) can issue cease and desist orders and "take 
such affirmative action including reinstatement with or without back pay as will effectuate 
the policies of this Act. • • ." Thus the Board's power is to be exercised to "prevent" but 
not necessarily to "adjudicate" disputes concerning unfair labor practices. It may be that 
the Board's most drastic order, the order to cease and desist and to reinstate with back pay, 
is close to full compensation for damage done, close to a judgment for tort. Nevertheless 
the primary function of such order is preventive and not compensatory, the reinstatement 
and back pay components of the order being relegated to subsidiary status in order to 
make the preventive function fully effective by taking away the advantages of engaging in 
unfair labor practices. This preventive quality of the Board order was stressed in the 
Laburnum opinion where the phrase "preventive procedure" appears repeatedly to describe 
the Board function. If this is so, there is no remedial conflict until a state also attempts to 
give "preventive relief," and thus no supersedure until that time. 
23 "To the extent that Congress prescribed preventive procedure against unfair labor 
practices, that case [Garner] recognized that the Act excluded conflicting state procedure 
to the same end. To the extent, however, that Congress has not prescribed procedure for 
dealing with the consequences of tortious conduct already committed, there is no ground for 
concluding that existing criminal penalties or liabilities for tortious conduct have been 
eliminated." Emphasis added. United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Construction 
Corp., 347 U.S. 656 at 665, 74 S.Ct. 833 (1954). 
24 This was the argument of Justices Douglas and Black, dissenting in the Laburnum 
case. 
25Findings and Policies of the LMRA, 61 Stat. L. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1952) 
§141. 
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produce uniform results. This is supposed to prevent the conflicts and 
confusion which would result from dispersion of authority among the 
states to handle what is said to be essentially an interstate or national 
problem. Keeping these considerations in mind, what effect on com-
merce will the Gamer and Laburnum rules have? 
It may well be argued that it takes longer to obtain an effective 
federal preventive order than to obtain a state injunction,26 that the 
injurious effects of an unfair labor practice are felt shortly after it is 
begun,27 and that quick relief to forestall this injury should be readily 
available in the interest of freeing the channels of interstate commerce 
from obstructions resulting from unfair labor practices. Under sections 
IO(j) and (1) of the NLM a temporary restraining order pending a 
Board decision must be sought when violations of section S(b)( 4) are 
alleged and is optional in the case of the other unfair labor practices, 
but, as shown in Oregon 11. Dobson,28 even the mandatory restraining 
order may be too slow. If, then, a state is not allowed to enjoin a 
wrongful activity even when its injunction is speedier than the federal 
remedy, the rationale must be that the need for consistent application 
of uniform substantive rules to such cases outweighs the need for quick 
preventive relief. The principle must be that independent state and 
federal agencies might reach inconsistent results, and that this would 
frustrate the fundamental purpose of minimizing the disruptive effect 
of unfair labor practices on commerce more than the adverse effect of 
a slower but uniform federal remedy. 
However, this basis for denying the states concurrent preventive 
authority applies with some force to the question of state authority to 
furnish a damage remedy. ~ertainly a lack of uniformity of substantive 
rules for handling unfair labor practices can develop just as readily out 
of damage actions as out of suits for injunctions. The Laburnum rule 
would leave each state free to develop its own rules as to damage actions 
growing out of unfair labor practices without regard to the substantive 
26 This was mentioned by Justice Day of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in a dis-
senting opinion in Gamer v. Teamsters Union, 373 Pa. 19, 94 A. (2d) 893 (1953). 
27 In the Laburnum case, all construction work stopped on the day the unfair labor 
practice began, and eight days later plaintiff's contracts for future work were cancelled. In 
the Gamer case, within 2 days after the practice had commenced, petitioner's business had 
fallen off 95%, and it was causing a loss of $400-500 per day, in addition to which can· 
cellation of its contracts with other carriers was threatened. 
28 195 Ore. 533, 245 P. (2d) 903 (1952). Because facts were alleged which would 
constitute a secondary boycott under §8(b)(4)(A), the Board was required to seek a 
temporary restraining order under §10(1). However, it informed petitioner that it would 
take "a few weeks'' to investigate the propriety of such action. The union's activity pre-
vented unloading a ship and cost petitioner $5,000 per day. Upon these facts, the state 
court found it had jurisdiction to enjoin the conduct until the Board took its action. 
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rules of the NLRB or of sister states. In the Garner case the Court 
strongly intimated its belief that it is the congressional policy to treat 
all unfair labor practices alike. Granting this, to allow states to make 
independently their own rules regarding unfair labor practice disputes 
will frustrate the realization of that policy even when their power is 
limited to the damage action. Presumably they could award damages 
for activity which the NLRB would not condemn, and vice versa. 
Furthermore, a rule emphasizing a conB.ict in remedies would 
allow state legislatures as well as state courts to enter actively the field 
of unfair labor practices. The Michigan Labor Mediation Act29 pro-
vides that certain listed employer and union acts are misdemeanors, and 
for "appropriate legal or equitable" relief. Under Laburnum it would 
appear that Michigan could thus formalize in a statute its own policy in 
regard to unfair labor practices, and make them crimes or torts. To this 
extent there is no remedial conB.ict with the federal act, but there is no 
assurance that the state substantive rules will be the same as those which 
Congress has declared. Uniformity of policy implies that there will be 
one standard by which the propriety of given conduct is judged, and 
while it is true there would then be but one standard in Michigan for de-
termining its criminal or tortious character, another standard must be 
resorted to in order to determine whether it can be enjoined. By limit-
ing exclusive federal jurisdiction over unfair labor practices to those 
cases where the remedy sought is a prohibitory order, there can be no 
uniform way to determine absolutely the propriety of given conduct, 
and thus no really effective national policy as to unfair labor practices. 
Moreover, the availability of a state damage remedy not only results 
in giving to the injured party an option of resorting to the federal agency 
if he desires, but reduces the economic pressure on him to do so. If the 
uniform federal preventive procedure were the only relief available, 
immediate resort to it by the party injured would be stimulated, for it 
would be the only way open to him to minimize his direct losses, and 
society's indirect losses as well. With an alternative damage remedy 
available, there is no such impetus to immediate settlement of disputes, 
and the public interest is not protected. As a policy matter, therefore, 
it is preferable to prevent or minimize such losses in the first instance 
than to allow them and then compensate the private party for his direct 
loss, but the Laburnum rule does not encourage such prevention in 
the first instance. 
29 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §423.22a, Mich. Stat. Ann. (1951) §17.454(23). 
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On the other hand, however, the basic fairness of providing some 
compensation for injury actually sustained is apparent. After the unfair 
labor practice has begun and damage is fait accompli, by definition 
federal preventive relief is no relief at all. As a practical matter, for the 
loss sustained before the unfair labor practice can be prevented, this is 
('conduct governable by the state or it is entirely ungoverned."30 
The number of cases involving unfair labor practice charges already 
is enormous and shows no sign of decreasing. It would seem to be physi-
cally impossible for a five man administrative board to have exclusive 
jurisdiction over every dispute concerning unfair practices arising in 
all of the forty-eight states and to do an adequate job at the same time. 
Some sharing of this jurisdiction with the states is inevitable. The 
Laburnum rule of retaining exclusive jurisdiction in the NLRB only 
with respect to preventive relief then makes some sense in that it will 
tend to assure uniformity in regard to the sanction most frequently 
used and thus having the most immediate effect on commerce. There 
is a more urgent need for having uniform substantive rules governing 
its use than uniform rules as to recovery of tort damages. 
Finally, the Laburnum rule arguably is consistent with the overall 
policy of the amended NLRA of making labor unions more, rather than 
less, responsible for their activity. The legislative history of that act 
clearly indicates this general policy.31 Since the NLRB has no general 
power to award damages, if it is to have exclusive jurisdiction over the 
whole area of unfair labor practices, the result is to decrease the actual 
legal responsibility of the guilty party, a result incompatible with the 
above policy. 
Conclusion 
In the Garner case the Court spoke generally of the need for avoid-
ing "a multiplicity of tribunals and a diversity of procedures [produc-
ing] incompatible or conflicting adjudications ... ," possibly indicating 
that the whole field of activities constituting unfair labor practices was 
to be the exclusive domain of the NLRB. The Laburnum case by 
ao International Union v. WERB, 336 U.S. 245, 69 S.Ct. 516 (1949). In United 
Construction Workers v. Laburnum Construction Corp., 347 U.S. 656 at 664, the Court 
said, "for us to cut off the injured respondent from this right of recovery will deprive it 
of its property without recourse or compensation." This possibly suggests that there is 
present an element of due process which requires that some sort of compensatory relief be 
available. 
31 Conference Report on H.R. 3020, H. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st sess., p. 52 
(1947); H. Rep No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st sess., p. 8 (1947); S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 
1st sess., p. 50 (1947); 93 CoNG. REc. 4042 (1947). 
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emphasizing only :r;-emedial conflicts is a retreat from that extreme posi-
tion. The Laburnum rule does appear to be a fair division of jurisdic-
tion except for the two contingencies mentioned above: (I) it may 
encourage states to legislate actively in the field of labor-management 
relations; (2) it may discourage immediate resort to remedies which 
would prevent unfair labor practices in the first instance. As to the 
first, it has been suggested that the states' power to act in the field 
should be confined to cases where the tortious or criminal liability 
results from statutes or legal principles which have general application, 
rather than those applying only to labor-management relations as 
such.32 This might be desirable, but it does not seem to be supported 
by the language of the Laburnum opinion.33 Possibly it will be en-
grafted onto the rule in later cases. The second objection might be 
met by limiting the damage remedy to compensation only for those 
injuries sustained before federal preventive relief could have been 
obtained by a party acting with reasonable diligence. Furthermore, 
the other side of the coin is that the possibility of being subject to 
financial liability in addition to a cease and desist order should deter 
the guilty party in the first instance. 
The basic problem is that Congress has not expressly settled the 
problem of federalism in regard to unfair labor practices, and the Court 
has had to deal with it within the limitations of the preemption doc-
trine. If the results do not measure up to congressional wishes or policy, 
it is now up to Congress to change the law and establish its intentions 
clearly and positively. 
Eugene Alkema, S.Ed. 
32 Cox, ''Federalism in the Law of Labor Relations," 67 HAn.v. L. R:sv. 1297 at 1321 
et seq. (1954). 
33 But the Court did say, "to the extent ••• Congress has not prescribed procedure for 
dealing with the consequences of tortious conduct already committed, there is no ground 
for concluding that existing criminal penalties or liabilities for tortious conduct have been 
eliminated." Emphasis added. United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Construction 
Corp., 347 U.S. 656 at 665, 74 S.Ct. 833 (1954). The word "existing" may then pre-
clude a state from affirmatively making such activity new crimes or torts. But on the ration-
ale of the case, that state jurisdiction is superseded only to the extent of a remedial conflict, 
the state's power is not preempted because there is no conflict in the federal and state 
remedies in such a case. 
